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Wrongful Life: Recognizing the Defective




Recent advances in medical technology and genetic study permit
physicians to predict, with varying degrees of accuracy, the likelihood
of prospective parents giving birth to a defective offspring.' This infor-
mation, when provided to prospective parents prior to conception or
during pregnancy, allows them the choice of preventing conception or
birth of potentially defective children by utilizing contraceptive tech-
niques or terminating the pregnancy with an abortion. Because of
these genetic and technological advances, courts increasingly have
been called upon to adjudicate claims based on a physician's failure to
detect or to disclose the possibility that a defective child will be born.
The effect of the physician's failure denies the parents, on their own
and on the child's behalf, the choice of preventing the conception or
birth of the defective infant. Specifically, the physician's failure results
in the infant's birth and subsequent existence as a severely handi-
capped or diseased individual. Lawsuits on behalf of or in the name of
the child, based upon such physician failures, are called "wrongful life"
actions.' To date, however, no appellate court of last resort has recog-
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1. For a discussion of those advanced techniques for predicting defective offspring,
see notes 76-82 and accompanying text infra.
2. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 28, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967). For a proper
understanding of the wrongful life cause of action it is essential to note at the outset of
this article that the cause of action is brought only by the child or, if deceased, by the ad-
ministrators of his/her estate. Any action brought by the child's parents for any injury
they may have suffered due to the child's birth and/or subsequent death is separate and
distinct from the child's action. Due in part to the complexity of the wrongful life issue
and the necessity to focus this article, the authors concentrate solely on the issue of




nized this cause of action.'
In contrast, courts have recognized that parents in their own right
can sue the physician for failing to inform prospective parents of the
potentiality of their giving birth to a defective child. The parents'
cause of action is properly called "wrongful birth,"' although courts
have applied various labels to describe the same type of claim.
This article focuses on the wrongful life issue, sets forth an explana-
tion for the courts' failure to permit such claims by defective children
and establishes a basis within the current legal framework for the
recognition of the wrongful life cause of action. Specifically, the
authors examine the genesis of the wrongful life cause of action; the
barriers to the recognition of such a claim; the ultimate barrier,
cultural lag; and the reasons why these barriers are inappropriate.
II. "WRONGFUL LIFE" -THE REJECTED CAUSE OF ACTION
A. Genesis of "Wrongful Life
In 1967, a state court in New Jersey was the first to be confronted
with a wrongful life cause of action. In Gleitman v. Cosgrove,5 the
plaintiff's mother consulted the defendant, Dr. Cosgrove, an obstetri-
cian and gynecologist, two months into her pregnancy, and told him
that she had contracted German measles (rubella) during the prior
month. Dr. Cosgrove advised that this would have no effect at all on
her child, although his testimony at trial showed that he withheld his
true opinion in the furtherance of his personal beliefs and opinion!0 For
3. See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895
(1978); Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 470, hear-
ing denied (1980). For discussions of the wrongful life cause of action, see Kashi, The Case of
the Unwanted Blessing: Wrongful Life, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1409 (1977); Tedeschi, On Tort
Liability for "Wrongful Life," 1 ISRAEL L. REV. 513 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Tedeschi];
Note, Park v. Chessin" The Continuing Judicial Development of the Theory of "Wrongful
Life," 4 AM. J. L. & MED. 211 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Theory of "Wrongful Life ' Note,
Father and Mother Know Best: Defining the Liability of Physicians for Inadequate Genetic
Counseling, 87 YALE L.J. 1488 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Inadequate Genetic Counseling].
See also Note, Torts Prior to Conception: A New Theory of Liability, 56 NEB. L. REV. 706
(1977); Comment, Preconception Torts: Foreseeing the Unconceived, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 621
(1977); Note, An Action Brought on Behalf of the Wrongfully Conceived Infant, 13 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 712 (1977).
4. See Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
5. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967). In Gleitman, the first count in the complaint was
brought on behalf of Jeffrey Gleitman, an infant, for his birth defects. The second count
was brought by his mother for the effect on her emotional state caused by her son's condi-
tion. The third count was brought by the father for the costs incurred in caring for Jef-
frey. Id. at 24, 227 A.2d at 690.
6. At trial, Dr. Cosgrove admitted that ten to twenty percent of fetuses exposed to
rubella during the first trimester are born with anomalies. Yet this information was
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the three months after her initial visit with Dr. Cosgrove, Mrs. Gleit-
man received prenatal care at the army base where her husband was
stationed. She told the army doctors about the German measles and
they advised her to discuss the matter with her regular physician
when she returned home. After she returned home, Mrs. Gleitman
again asked Dr. Cosgrove about the effects of her exposure to German
measles, and again received a reassuring answer. Subsequently, Mrs.
Cosgrove gave birth to a son with serious visual, hearing and speech
impairments.'
Suing for its wrongful life, the infant asserted that Dr. Cosgrove's
negligent advice precluded his mother from obtaining an abortion.
Thus, the infant plaintiff's birth with defects was alleged to be the
proximate consequence of Dr. Cosgrove's advice. The trial court re-
fused to recognize the wrongful life claim as a matter of law.' Affirm-
ing the decision of the trial court, the New Jersey Supreme Court
denied recovery for two reasons. First, the court denied recovery
because there were no damages cognizable at law, finding that it was
impossible to measure the difference between the infant's life with
defects against the "utter 'void" of nonexistence The court reached
this conclusion by attempting to assess damages under a traditional
tort valuation, where the remedy afforded an injured party is designed
to place that party in the position he would have occupied but for the
negligence of the defendant. Application of this standard led the court
to conclude that it could not "weigh the value of life with impairments
against the nonexistence of life itself.""0 Second, the court determined
that even if damages were cognizable at law, a claim would be pre-
cluded by the "countervailing public policy supporting the preciousness
of human life.""
withheld from Mrs. Gleitman because he believed that "some doctors would recommend
and perform an abortion for this reason but that [it was not] proper to destroy four
healthy babies because the fifth one would have some defect." Id. at 26, 227 A.2d at 691.
7. Id. at 25, 227 A.2d at 690.
8. Id. at 26, 227 A.2d at 691.
9. Id. at 28, 227 A.2d at 692.
10. Id. See also Tedeschi. note 3 supra.
11. 49 N.J. at 31, 227 A.2d at 693. The court reasoned that "if Jeffrey could have
been asked as to whether his life should be snuffed out before his full term of gestation
could run its course, our felt intuition of human nature tells us he would almost surely
choose life with defects as against no life at all." Id. at 30, 227 A.2d at 693. The court was
undoubtedly swayed in reaching this conclusion by the New Jersey law which prohibited
at that time any abortion "without lawful justification." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:87-1 (West
1969) (repealed 1979). In a lengthy concurring opinion devoted to the question of whether
an abortion of Mrs. Gleitman's fetus would have violated that statute, Judge Francis con-
cluded that indeed, it would have. Since medical science had not yet advanced to the point
of determining the degree of a fetus' defect, it would have been improper to abort when
1980 859
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One year later, relying on the Gleitman decision, the New York
Supreme Court of King's County partially set aside the jury decision in
Stewart v. Long Island College Hospital2 and dismissed the infant
plaintiff's action for wrongful life." The suit was brought against a
hospital by the infant girl Stewart, who was born with serious physical
and mental disabilities. Mrs. Stewart, who had contracted German
measles (rubella) in the first trimester of her pregnancy, had been ad-
vised by her physician that her child might be afflicted with congenital
disabilities. She later entered defendant hospital to obtain a eugenic
abortion. Upon reviewing her case history, the hospital determined
that no therapeutic abortion was needed and advised Mrs. Stewart
that she should not seek an abortion.'4 She subsequently gave birth to
the defective infant plaintiff.
The infant alleged that her wrongful life was the proximate result of
the hospital's failure to disclose that two of the doctors consulted by
the defendant believed the pregnancy should be terminated. It was
argued that but for this failure to disclose, Mrs. Stewart would have
sought an abortion. 5 The court rejected these allegations, relying pri-
marily upon the two rationales set forth by the Gleitman court. First,
damages would be impossible to assess because a court could not
"weigh the value of life itself with the impairment against the non-
existence of life itself."'6 Second, public policy concerns compelled the
preservation and not the prevention of human life. The court concluded
that there is no remedy for being born under a handicap when the only
such defect may have been minor. Id. at 40, 227 A.2d at 699 (Francis, J., concurring).
Judge Francis emphasized that since the abortion was not justifiable, only the public
policymakers who created the criminal offense should make determinations as to the avail-
ability of this procedure; they would be better equipped than courts to reach an informed
judgment on such a controversial and emotional matter. Id. at 48, 227 A.2d at 703 (Fran-
cis, J., concurring).
12. 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1968), modified, 35 App. Div. 2d 531, 313
N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972).
13. Id. at 436, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 46. The Stewart complaint consisted of two additional
counts. The second count was brought by the mother alleging negligence on the hospital's
part for its failure to inform the mother of the conflict of opinion regarding the need for
an abortion. The third count, brought by the father, was derived from the mother's cause
of action. Id. at 437-39, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 46-48. Both counts were rejected on appeal. 35
App. Div. 2d at 532, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 503.
14. In fact, two of the four doctors who examined Mrs. Stewart's case history were of
the opinion that an abortion should be performed. Two believed that no abortion should
be performed. 58 Misc. 2d at 433, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 43. That no abortion'was performed was
probably due to the lack of evidence that Mrs. Stewart's health was in any way en-
dangered by her child's birth.
15. Id. at 438-39, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 47-48.
16. Id. at 435-36, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 45-46.
860 Vol. 18:857
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alternative is not to have been born at all." Therefore, although the
roots of the wrongful life cause of action have been established in cer-
tain jurisdictions, courts have continued to assert these two rationales
for rejecting the cause of action.'8
The systematic rejection of wrongful life claims rests upon three
grounds. First, it has been held that the physician defendant does not
owe a duty of care to the unborn or unconceived because neither were
considered to be legal beings at the time of the alleged negligent act. 9
From that conclusion, it followed that the defendant could not be
viewed as having committed a negligent act. Second, courts have re-
fused to recognize a damage" in wrongful life actions because life of
any quality has been considered to be of greater value than nonex-
istence." Finally, wrongful life causes of action conflict with momen-
tous public policy considerations."
Traditionally, these barriers are the work of judges deciding "ques-
tions of law" rather than of juries making "findings of fact."' 3 Some
courts even refuse to consider the seemingly legal questions of duty,
proximate cause and damages because "public policy" makes legal
resolution impossible. 4 Ironically, these .same courts, although refusing
to recognize the role of the jury, hold that the issues of wrongful life
should be settled by legislators, as spokesmen for the people, rather
than by courts."
The identified barriers can be designated as belonging to one of two
specific categories: artificial barriers and real barriers. The distinction
between the two is that the artificial barriers are actually emotionally
17. Id at 436-37, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 45-46.
18. Interestingly, although no court recognizes the child's claim in wrongful life law-
suits, two state supreme courts, in 1975, recognized for the first time the parental cause
of action previously denied by, among others, the Gleitman and Stewart courts. See
Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d
766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975). See also Berman v. Allen, 80 N.J. 421, 434, 404 A.2d 8, 15
(1979) (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a scholarly exposition of
the parental causes of action in cases of wrongful life, see Kass & Shaw, The Risk of
Birth Defects: Jacobs v. Theimer and Parents' Right to Know, 2 AM. J. L. & MED. 213
(1976-77).
19. See Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
20. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Becker v. Schwartz, 46
N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). See also Tedeschi, supra note 3, at
529.
21. See Tedeschi, supra note 3, at 529.
22. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. at 30, 227 A.2d at 693; Note, A Cause of Ac-
tion for "Wrongful Life" A Suggested Analysis, 55 MINN. L. REV. 58, 74 (1970); Inade-
quate Genetic Counseling, supra note 3, at 1502.
23. See notes 24-27 and accompanying text infra.
24. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
25. Id. at 412, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
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inspired; there is no basis for these barriers in tort law. In contrast,
the real barriers are inspired by cultural lag; modern medical tech-
nology, producing more accurate predictive and diagnostic capabilities,
has outpaced beliefs that rest on technologies long outdated.
B. Artificial Barriers
As in any cause of action based upon negligence, the plaintiff in a
wrongful life case must demonstrate the existence of a duty and that
the breach of that duty was the proximate cause of the damages suf-
fered.' Prior to 1946, there was no recognized duty of care owed to an
unborn child because the child was regarded as being separate from its
mother only after its birth. The United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, in Bonbrest v. Kotz,27 revolutionized this area of
law by holding that actions for prenatal injuries were allowable if the
"child" was viable at the time of the injury and it survived birth.
Recognition of the "child's" rights was further expanded in 1953, when
a New York court held, in Kelly v. Gregory,28 that a duty of care is
owed to an infant from the very point of its conception. Every jurisdic-
tion now recognizes suits brought by children for prenatal injuries'
occurring after conception. This duty of care was subsequently ex-
panded to include children not yet conceived at the time the tortious
conduct occurred.
For example, in Zepeda v. Zepeda,3 ° the Illinois Appellate Court
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS 143-45 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
27. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
28. 282 App. Div. 2d 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953).
29. E.g., Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Kelly v. Gregory, 282
App. Div. 2d 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953). The cases following Bonbrest "brought about
the most spectacular abrupt reversal of a well settled rule in the whole history of the law
of torts." PROSSER, supra note 26, at 336-37. In 1967, Texas became the last jurisdiction to
overturn the rule denying recovery for prenatal injuries. See id. at 337. Moreover,
"[a]Imost all of the jurisdictions have allowed recovery even though the injury occurred
during the early weeks of pregnancy, when the child was neither viable nor quick." Id.
30. 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964). In
Zepeda, the infant plaintiff alleged that the defendant, his father, had induced his mother
to have sexual relations by promising to marry her. This promise was not kept, and could
not be kept because unbeknownst to the mother, the defendant was already married. The
infant plaintiff charged, inter alia, that the defendant had injured him in his person, prop-
erty and reputation by causing him to be born an adulterine bastard. Id. at 245-46, 190
N.E.2d at 851. In short, the infant's suit sought after-birth damages for a preconceptual
tort (fraud).
The Zepeda court went out of its way in its attempt to sustain this cause of action,
although the tort law at that time did not recognize the legal existence of a child until it
had actually been conceived. But the court, seeking to make preconceptual torts action-
able, reasoned:
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determined that a physician owed a child a duty prior to conception,
concluding that it was foreseeable that a child ultimately conceived
would be harmed by the physician's negligence. Specifically, the court
ruled that the wrong "progressed as did [the child] from essence to ex-
istence. When . . .[the child] became a person the nature of the wrong
became fixed."'" Ten years later, in Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson
Laboratories, Inc.,32 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit similarly concluded that there is a duty owed to a child not yet
conceived. In Jorgensen, it was alleged that birth control pills taken by
the child's inother prior to conception caused the child's injury.'3 The
court, in concluding that a preconception duty existed, reasoned that
"[i]f the view prevailed that tortious conduct occurring prior to concep-
tion is not actionable on behalf of the infant ultimately injured by the
wrong, then an infant suffering personal injury from a defective food
product, manufactured before his conception, would be without
remedy."'3 In 1977, this preconception duty was reaffirmed by the Illi-
nois Supreme Court in Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital,s' where it was
But what if the wrongful conduct takes place before conception? Can the defen-
dant be held accountable if his act was completed before the plaintiff was con-
ceived? Yes, for it is possible to incur... "a conditional prospective liability in tort
to one not yet in being." It makes no difference how much time elapses between a
wrongful act and a resulting injury if there is a causal relation between them.
I& at 250, 190 N.E.2d at 853. Although the court was able to hurdle the legal obstacle of
duty of care, it was stymied by the public policy considerations inherent in the recognition
of such a claim. The court poignantly assessed these considerations as follows:
What does disturb us is the nature of the new action and the related suits which
would be encouraged. Encouragement would extend to all others born into the
world under conditions they might regard as adverse. One might seek damages for
being born of a certain color, another because of race; one for being born with a
hereditary disease, another for inheriting unfortunate family characteristics; one
for being born into a large and destitute family, another because a parent has an
unsavory reputation.
... How long will it be before a child so produced sues in tort those responsible
for its being?
Id. at 260, 190 N.E.2d at 858. These considerations forced an otherwise willing court to re-
ject a cause of action for wrongful birth. Fearful of opening a veritable "Pandora's Box" of
litigation, the Zepeda court sidestepped the issue by concluding that because of these
weighty public considerations, the "policy of the State should be declared by representa-
tives of the people" and not by the courts. Id. at 263, 190 N.E.2d at 859.
31. Id. at 253, 190 N.E.2d at 855.
32. 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973).
33. Id. at 238-39.
34. Id at 240.
35. 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977). For a discussion of Renslow and the nature
of the claim asserted in that case, see Note, Prenatal Injuries Caused by Negligence Prior
to Conception" An Expansion of Tort Liability, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 568 (1977); A New
Theory of Liability, note 3 supra; 44 Mo. L. REV. 143 (1979); 52 TUL. L. REV. 893 (1978); 31
VAND. L. REV. 218 (1978); 12 VAL. U.L. REV. 603 (1977).
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alleged that the child's injury was caused by an improper blood trans-
fusion given to the child's mother prior to its conception. As the Illi-
nois Supreme Court ruled, it has long been recognized that "a duty
may exist to one foreseeably harmed though he be unknown and
remote in time and place,"" and that it would be "illogical to bar relief
for an act done prior to conception where the defendant would be
liable for this same conduct had the child, unbeknownst to him, been
conceived prior to his act." 7
Zepeda, Jorgensen and Renslow show that where duty is viewed
alone, there can be no doubt that physicians owe both the unconceived
and conceived plaintiff children in wrongful life causes of action a duty.
Thus, courts that have trouble finding a duty of care are erecting arti-
ficial barriers for reasons that are personal to the judges.
As with any other malpractice-based tort, once a duty has been
established it is necessary to decide if there has been a breach of that
duty. This determination is a question of fact to be decided by the jury
after weighing the expert testimony as to the applicable professional
standards of medical care. Because none of the courts rejecting wrong-
ful life causes of action have based their rulings on plaintiffs' inability
or failure to demonstrate a breach of duty, the more relevant issues of
proximate causation and damages will be explored.
In cases involving allegations of wrongful life, the defendant physi-
cian does not cause the child's defect. Rather, the defendant physician
allegedly causes the defective child to be born by denying its mother
the choice of aborting a defective fetus. This aspect of the wrongful
life cause of action has caused courts to confuse the elements of the
prima facie case, particularly that of proximate cause. That this confu-
sion, when coupled with the emotional elements associated with this
cause of action, further obfuscates the issues, is clearly demonstrated
by Becker v. Schwartz,38 a 1978 pronouncement on wrongful life causes
of action.
In Becker, the New York Court of Appeals refused to recognize the
wrongful life cause of action, reasoning that first, the infant had not
suffered any legally cognizable injury because there was no precedent
determining that a child had the fundamental right to be born as a
whole, functional human being. 9 Second, the court noted that the
remedy in a negligence action is designed to return the party to the
position he would have occupied had the tortfeasor not acted in a negli-
36. 67 Ill. 2d at 357, 367 N.E.2d at 1254-55.
37. Id. at 357, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
38. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
39. Id. at 411, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900. The Park and Becker cases
were decided together-by the New York Court of Appeals.
Vol. 18:857864
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gent manner." This standard is difficult to apply in wrongful life cases
because restoration of the infant to the position he would have occu-
pied but for the failure of the defendant would result in depriving the
infant plaintiff of his very existence. Therefore, the Becker court
determined that "wrongful life demands a calculation of damages
dependent upon a comparison between the Hobson's choice of life in an
impaired state and nonexistence." 1
The New York Court of Appeals did not accept the notion that the
physician should be liable for causing the existence of a defective in-
fant. Possibly, the court did not view the choice from the pragmatic
perspective that the cost of supporting a defective existence clearly
exceeds the cost of nonexistence. From this point of view, there is a
real choice involved. It could also be argued that a physician's failure
to warn of the potentiality of a defective existence, which ultimately
comes to fruition, does not differ from a defendant whose negligent ad-
vice causes a client (or patient) to suffer financial loss or, alternatively,
causes the accrual of a financial obligation that would otherwise have
been avoided. Liability should attach in all such circumstances if the
jury is satisfied as to the existence of duty and a breach of that duty
which proximately caused the injury. The Becker court reached a con-
trary conclusion, possibly because of the judges' personal belief that
life of any quality is preferable to nonexistence. This might explain the
confusion as to the issue of proximate cause.
The confusion could be rectified if the determination of proximate
cause were placed back in the power of the jury. It has been suggested
that proximate cause exists if it can be established that the defend-
ant's conduct was the cause of the tortious event and if that conduct
was a material element and substantial factor in bringing about the in-
jury." The determination whether the conduct was a substantial factor
should be made by the jury unless the issue is so clear that reasonable
men could not differ."
40. Id. at 411-12, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
41. Id. at 412, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900. The Becker court's analogy of
the "Hobson's choice" is worth exploring to provide insight to the rationale of the court
for its decision to reject the claim for wrongful life. Thomas Hobson (1544-1631) was an
innkeeper in Cambridge, England. See WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1076
(1966); 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 564 (1974). He required every traveler who wanted a
horse to "choose" the one from the stall nearest the door. Thus, he exercised each of his
horses on a rotating basis. Imagine, however, that Hobson had an unridable or dangerous
horse in his stable, and that this dangerous horse was in the stall nearest the door.
Although Hobson did not make the horse dangerous, would he not be liable to a traveler
injured by the horse if his failure to warn the traveler of the potential risk denied the
traveler the choice of skipping the trip?
42. PROSSER, supra note 26, at 236-43.
43. Id at 242-43.
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Proximate causation in wrongful life cases should not be placed in
the category of issues "so clear that reasonable men could not differ."
Thus, because a physician's duty for preconception or postconception
torts has been recognized, and because questions of proximate causa-
tion, if they arise, should be treated as questions of fact for the jury,
judicial grants of summary or accelerated judgment on the pleadings
for plaintiff's failure to state a legally cognizable claim should only oc-
cur where there are no damages as a matter of law. Moreover,
whether there are damages should depend upon the values of the
plaintiff and society rather than upon the values of a judicial panel.
The damages question is the final, and most confusing, element of
the prima facie case for the wrongful life cause of action. The issue is
most perplexing because it involves the unresolved dilemma of mere
existence versus the quality of life. Recent advances in medical tech-
nology, which enable hospitals to artificially prolong life by means of
extraordinary methods, have forced courts to approach this issue, as
well as the question of whether a person has the right to die.
The right to die cases, most notably Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz" and In re Quinlan,5 have moved the debate
on life versus quality of life from schools and seminaries into the
courts. Increasingly, the recognition of the individual's interest in
quality of life is supplanting society's prior value of life of any quality
over death."' As the technologies that promoted the debate of life ver-
sus quality of life continue to evolve, the debate, if it has not already
been won, will continue to favor those who recognize that the indi-
vidual, and only the individual, can decide whether quality of life is
more important than a defective life. And when the individual is in-
competent (in a coma or unborn) the courts are increasingly likely to
allow guardians or parents to choose on behalf of the incompetent.'
Thus, where parents plead that they would have chosen to abort or
avoid conception if the defendant phygician had properly disclosed the
information necessary to allow the parents to make an informed judg-
ment on their own and on the child's behalf, the courts should recog-
nize the jury's right to determine the damages precipitated by a defec-
tive existence.
This logic has yet to prevail in an appellate level decision in a
wrongful life case, although such a notion has been alluded to at the
44. 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1976).
45. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
46. For an excellent discussion of the role that right to die cases have in the wrong-
ful life cause of action, see 4 AM. J. L. & MED. 211, 222-24 (1978).
47. See notes 48-49 and accompanying text infra.
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trial level, as was the situation in Park v. Chessin." In Park, a suit was
brought against two obstetricians by the parents of an infant born
with a degenerative genetic disease.49 Mrs. Park gave birth in June,
1969 to a baby who, afflicted with polycystic kidney disease,5 0 died only
five hours after birth. Concerned with a possible recurrence of this
disease in a child conceived in the future, the Parks consulted the
defendant obstetricians, who had treated Mrs. Park during her first
pregnancy, to determine the likelihood of this contingency. In response
to the Parks' inquiry, the defendant obstetricians misinformed the
Parks that inasmuch as polycystic kidney disease was not hereditary,
the chances of their conceiving a second child afflicted with this
48. 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1976), modified, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400
N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), modified, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
49. The Park complaint consisted of five separate counts. The analysis in this article
deals principally with the allegations in the first count-the child's action for wrongful
life. The second count was for damages for the emotional and physical injuries suffered by
the mother as a result of the birth of her child. The third count was for damages for emo-
tional injuries and expenses suffered by the husband. The fourth count was for damages
for the injury suffered by the husband occasioned by the loss of his wife's services. The
fifth count was for the damages on behalf of both the wife and husband, as administrators
of their child's estate, for wrongful death. 46 N.Y.2d at 407, 386 N.E.2d at 809, 413
N.Y.S.2d at 877.
50. Polycystic kidney disease is a condition "characterized by numerous cysts scat-
tered diffusely throughout the kidneys, sometimes resulting in organs that tend to resem-
ble grapelike clusters of cysts." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 744 (4th ed. 1976). Multi-
ple cysts form in the kidney of patients with polycystic kidney disease. The abnormality
begins in fetal life and progresses throughout the life of the individual. It involves both
kidneys, and frequently progresses somewhat symmetrically on both sides. Usually one
kidney seems to be affected more than the other. Occasionally, on clinical examination, it
may be difficult to demonstrate the disease in both kidneys, one of the pair seeming to be
free of the disorder. Cysts are almost invariably found if sections of the apparently free
kidney can be obtained for microscopic study. Kidneys have been seen in which apparent
freedom from the disease was present in half of one kidney, the other half being affected
by cysts, and all of the opposite kidney being affected. 4 A. R. GRAY, ATTORNEY'S TEXT-
BOOK OF MEDICINE 286.65 (3d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as GRAY]. Two varieties of the,
disease seem to prevail. In one variety, cysts form largely in the medullary (medulla is the
inner portion of an organ) portion of the kidney and produce so great a deformity early in
fetal life that the baby dies shortly after birth or in the earliest stages of infancy. Such
kidneys show a myriad of cysts of fairly uniform size which give the kidneys the appear-
ance of a sponge. In the second variety, the cyst formation is largely confined to the cor-
tex (the outer layers of an organ) instead of the medulla; the degree of destruction is
somewhat less in its early stages; and the disease progresses more slowly. In individuals
afflicted with the second variety, the presence of polycystic kidney disease may not be
detected until adult life. Not infrequently, the finding is made at autopsy in the elderly,
the patient having died of causes other than renal disease. Id. at 286.65(1). Although the
court in Park did not indicate which one of the two varieties of the disease the child suf-
fered from, its early death suggests that the disease afflicted the medullary portion of the
child's kidney.
Duquesne Law Review
disease were "practically nil."5' Based upon this misinformation, the
Parks made a conscious choice to conceive a second child. Thus, Mrs.
Park became pregnant and gave birth in July, 1970 to a child who simi-
larly suffered from polycystic kidney disease. Unlike their first child,
however, the Parks' second child survived for two and one-half years
before succumbing to this progressive disease. The parents' suit on
behalf of the child for wrongful life alleged negligence on the part of
the obstetricians for advising them to conceive and bear a child when
it was foreseeable that the child would suffer from congenital defects.2
In an unprecedented decision, the Supreme Court of Queens County
sustained the cause of action.53 The court sidestepped the heretofore
insurmountable question of damage valuation by simply holding that
resolution of the question "should be the pragmatic determination of
the trier of facts upon a complete analysis of the evidence presented at
trial."5' This approach, although not fully developed in an extensive
opinion, makes good sense. Allowing the jury to evaluate the parents
and other witnesses according to the quality of life values held by the
parents pays heed to sensitivities of the parents over the antiquated
doctrinaire value that life of any quality is better than death. More-
over, what societal group is in a better position than a jury to respond
to evolving social values?
On appeal, however, the New York Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the lower court.5 The majority dismissed the wrongful life
cause of action on its own professed inability to calculate the extent
and amount of damages, inferring from that inability that no legally
cognizable injury had been suffered." Therefore, the issue could not be
51. 46 N.Y.2d at 407, 386 N.E.2d at 809, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 897. On the contrary, poly-
cystic kidney disease is a congenital deformity; it is also an hereditary defect. It is carried
by the male and female alike, and if one of the parents is afflicted it appears frequently in
the offspring. It may also appear in the offspring of parents who themselves do not seem
to have the disease, but if a survey is made of the ancestry of such a patient the disease
will be found to be present in other members of the family. GRAY, supra note 50, at
286.65(2). Indeed, polycystic kidney disease is found very frequently in our general popula-
tion. It occurs probably as frequently as 1 in 5,000 individuals who seek medical aid for ill-
ness. Id at 286.65(3).
52. 46 N.Y.2d at 406-07, 386 N.E.2d at 809, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
53. 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204, modified, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110
(1977), aff'd, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). See also Curlender v.
Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, hearing denied (1980).
54. 88 Misc. 2d at 232, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 211.
55. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 40f, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
56. Id. at 411, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900. It is important to note that the
New York Court of Appeals recognized the parents' claim for the costs of raising the
defective child. Unfortunately, it rightfully gave money to the wrong parties-the
parents. No probate court and no guardian can ensure that the money provided for the
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submitted to the jury because there would be no legal standards which
the jury could apply to the factual considerations of a given case.5 7
The New York Court of Appeals chose not to recognize an important
aspect of the damage issue which could have been construed as a basis
for establishing the wrongful life claim. As the Supreme Court of
Queens County correctly reasoned, the trier of fact and not the court
should determine the existence or nonexistence of damages." This is
especially true where, as in causes of action such as wrongful life, the
finding of damage depends on the resolution of moral, religious and
quality of life determinations that can only be made by the jury. In-
deed, it increasingly appears that the wrongful life cause of action, and
particularly the question of damage, is not a question of law, but
rather is a question of fact that should be submitted to the jury.
Although, as suggested by the New York Court of Appeals, legisla-
tures are capable of making this determination,89 legislators have
demonstrated an unwillingness to address controversial moral issues
(e.g., abortion). Therefore, the only alternative is to have juries pro-
claim the societal values that should prevail. This would ensure that
both the plaintiff's and defendant's interests are protected by an
adversarial process in which the evidence and interests of the parties
are weighed by the jury. Ironically, whether wrongful life and the
issue of damages are legal or factual questions is, in the long term, a
moot issue. As the zeitgeist changes, the attitudes of judges will
change so that today's judge deciding wrongful life as a question of law
on the basis of his values will tomorrow view that question as an issue
care and maintenance of the child will enure to the child's benefit. Arguably, nothing
prevents the parents from using that money for their own purpose. Further, no court or
guardian may intervene to prevent the parents from delegating the defective child to the
state and its taxpayers, with a windfall accruing to the parents.
Admittedly, the parents may suffer a loss as a result of the defendant physician's
wrong; however, the money awarded for the support of the defective child should go to
the child or the child's legal representative so that probate supervision can be provided.
Nothing in such an analysis would prohibit the parents from recovering whatever damage
they could demonstrate on a traditional negligence theory.
Whether controversial damages, especially pain and suffering, should be recoverable
on a wrongful life cause of action should be decided by the jury with definitional instruc-
tions from the court. Because the existence and measure of damages depends in large part
on the values of the parents and the emerging values of society, the question of damages
should be answered by the jury on a case-by-case basis. Such an approach would also
solve the thorny problem of deciding what degree of defect should exist before compensa-
tion would flow, by moving from an "all or nothing" model to one of gradation. Likewise,
both the plaintiff's and defendant's interests would be protected by an adversary process
in which the parties' proofs and interests are weighed and balanced by the jury.
57. Id. at 411-12, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900-01.
58. 88 Misc. 2d at 232, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 211.
59. 46 N.Y.2d at 412, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
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of fact, appropriate for resolution by the jury. Unfortunately, this ap-
proach denies the defective child his day in court today, as a matter of
law.
In sum, this discussion shows that artificial barriers are antithetical
to the traditional values of tort law. Further, the legal foundation ex-
ists upon which the cause of action for wrongful life can be predicated.
It has been established that duty, breach of duty, proximate cause and
damages may exist in any given case and, therefore, the jury should be
given the opportunity to make determinations of liability according to
each factual setting.
C. Real Barriers
Certain public policies constitute real barriers to the acceptance of
the wrongful life cause of action. These barriers include the mistaken
belief that wrongful life plaintiffs are claiming the right to be born
whole and unimpaired; the "old saw" that recognizing wrongful life will
produce a flood of litigation; the quandry posed by the alleged need to
determine, in advance, what defects of what degree are compensable;
and the logically inconsistent fear that recognition of wrongful life
would prompt defensive physicians to recommend abortion. These bar-
riers, however, should be broken down and reevaluated so as to permit
recognition of the wrongful life claim.
Plaintiffs in wrongful life cases do not claim the right to be born
whole. Rather, they claim the right not to be born. The distinction be-
tween the two is the difference between a costly defective existence
and nonexistence. Another difference is the unborn child's right to
choose, through its parents, a defective existence as opposed to non-
existence. Accordingly, each plaintiff would be required to prove that
if the defendant physician had made the choice possible, the choice
elected would have been nonexistence. Assertions that wrongful life
plaintiffs claim a right to be born whole and without defect would only
apply if the physician caused the defect, and this, by definition, is not
the claim made in the wrongful life actions.
The "floodgates" spectre as a basis upon which to reject the wrong-
ful life cause of action is equally groundless. No plaintiff in a wrongful
life action can recover unless a deviation from the medical standard of
care is demonstrated. And, if such a deviation is shown, the courts
should not deny these plaintiffs the rights all other negligence plain-
tiffs enjoy. The mere presence of a child with a defect does not estab-
lish the wrongful life cause of action unless the plaintiff child can show
that the birth would not have occurred but for the negligence of the
defendant physician.
The problem as to what degree of defect must exist before a
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recovery can be made does not create an insurmountable barrier
either. Any degree of defect, where there is a causative wrong, should
justify a recovery, and the amount of the recovery should be for the
jury to determine.'
Difficulty in the estimation of a monetary value has not been allowed
to constitute a barrier to a plaintiff's recovery."1 There need only be a
basis for the reasonable ascertainment of damages.62 One court has ex-
pressed this rule of damages in the following strong language: "[W]here
a wrong itself is of such a nature as to preclude the computation of
damages with precise exactitude, it would be a 'perversion of funda-
mental principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured [party], and
thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts.'"
Finally, the argument that recognizing wrongful life will cause
physicians to recommend abortion is misguided. The physician's negli-
gent conduct in wrongful life causes of action is his failure to ade-
quately or accurately inform prospective parents of the likelihood that a
defective child will be born. Whether the response to that information
is a decision to have an abortion is the parents' choice alone. The
physician provides a service for the patient, but it is the patient alone
who is ultimately responsible for the decision as to her medical treat-
ment.
It is interesting to note that these so called real barriers reflect a
sense of artificiality in that they have been constructed partially on
the basis of emotional objections to wrongful life. Therefore, the valid-
ity of the conclusions drawn from these factors becomes suspect, and
militates against their adoption as support for judicial rejection of the
wrongful life cause of action. All of the barriers identified, both real
and artificial, are actually symtomatic of the single greatest barrier-
cultural lag. Only when this barrier is overcome will the arguments,
refuting the noted ancillary barriers, be resolved in favor of recogni-
tion of the wrongful life cause of action.
III. THE ULTIMATE BARRIER TO RECOGNITION
OF WRONGFUL LIFE -CULTURAL LAG
The wrongful life cause of action should, and eventually will, be sus-
tained. The failure of courts and legislatures to take the appropriate
steps to permit the defective child to sue for its wrongful life is an ex-
60. See notes 42-43 and accompanying text supra.
61. Green v. Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 545, 265 N.W.2d 411 (1978); Betancourt v.
Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. Ct. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975).
62. Green v. Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 545, 265 N.W.2d 411 (1978).
63. Berman v. Allen, 80 N.J. 421, 428, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (1979) (quoting Story Parchment
Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931)).
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ample of what has sometimes been described as cultural lag. Sociolo-
gist William Fielding Ogburn stated his "hypothesis of cultural lag" in
1922:
Where one part of culture changes first ... through some discovery or in-
vention, and occasions changes in some part of culture dependent upon it,
there frequently is a delay .... The extent of this lag will vary . . .but
may exist for ... years, during which time there may be said to be a mal-
adjustment."
The mechanical invention and scientific discovery in the fields of
genetics and medicine have resulted in a cultural lag between those ad-
vances and the laws fashioned by the courts and legislatures. Although
"technology cracks the whip," judicial and governmental institutions
do not always develop correspondingly. The result is that these "insti-
tutions of society slip out of gear and humanity suffers because of it."65
It is within this context that wrongful life may be examined.
Examining wrongful life within the context of the theory of cultural
lag requires satisfaction of the theory's four steps:
(1) the identification of at least two variables;
(2) the demonstration that these two variables were in adjust-
ment;
(3) the determination by dates that one variable has changed
while the other has not changed or that one has changed in
greater degree than the other; and
(4) that when one variable has changed earlier or in greater
degree than the other, there is less satisfactory adjustment
than existed before.6
Proceeding to the first step, the two variables to be identified in
wrongful life are the courts and medical technology. Courts and the
law, by their very nature, are resistant to change. Lawyers and the
courts cherish stability and do not like to have it disarranged by inven-
tion.67 Indeed, the common law is a codification of certain old customs
on vital matters.68 Thus, these common laws serve crucial functions as
64. W. OGBURN, SOCIAL CHANGE WITH RESPECT TO CULTURE AND ORIGINAL NATURE
201 (1922) [hereinafter cited as SOCIAL CHANGE]. For other discussions of the theory of
cultural lag see generally S. CHASE, THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND (1948); H. Hart,
Social Theory and Social Change, in SYMPOSIUM ON SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (1959); H. Hart,
The Hypothesis of Cultural Lag: A Present Day View, in TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL
CHANGE (1957); W. OGBURN, ON CULTURE AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1964) [hereinafter cited as
ON CULTURE].
65. ON CULTURE, supra note 64, at 143.
66. ld. at 89.




they relate to stationary aspects of our society. But what of those
areas that change and continue to develop? New laws are fashioned
and the purpose of these new laws, like the old, is to make rules that
society can follow. 9 However, these rules are only applicable to situa-
tions that are continuing. Thus, Ogburn observed that:
[L]aw-makers and law-administrators seem to have the functions of laying
out grooves for the flow of human behavior and of trying to force human
beings to fit into the grooves. Such an assignment is quite in conformity
with life as found in a stationary society. But in our changing society,
technology is continuously breaking up many of the grooves that law
makes and administers. Thus law and technology are opponents as in a
battle. So it is natural that the courts should hark back to precedent, and
the administrator is under oath to enforce the law, no matter what the
changes may bring about."0
The courts therefore represent a unique institution, constantly under
seige from forces promoting change.7' At the opposite end of this con-
tinuum of change is medical technology. The medical researcher strives
for change and can never become satisfied with the status quo. His
profession demands that he always be on the verge of some new dis-
covery that will enhance or protect life. Indeed, without invention the
need for his very existence would cease.
Having identified two crucial variables, the second requirement is
satisfied by illustrating that at one time the courts and technology, in
terms of predicting genetic defect, were in adjustment. Up until about
fifteen years ago science was not capable of detecting harmful in-
herited traits. This was because the methods and instruments utilized
to detect and predict the occurrence of such traits were often inexact.
Even when a genetic defect appeared in the families of a couple who
wished to have children, a reliable evaluation of the risk of reoccur-
rence of the undesired trait was seldom possible.72 Indeed, such predic-
tions were often based solely on the pattern of a trait's occurrence
among an affected individual's family;"3 and this method was at times
supplemented by more general population data derived from empirical
observation of other families with afflicted relatives. ' Thus, unless a
69. Id
70. Id.
71. Meanwhile, in our rapidly changing society, legislatures have a difficult task, with
their large membership and their tradition of deliberation, of keeping up with the new
and changing conditions brought about by technology. Thus, legislatures could easily be
included in the cultural lag theory as a third variable.
72. See Inadequate Genetic Counseling, supra note 3, at 1492.
73. Id. The effectiveness of this type of study is limited because accurate information
is often difficult to obtain. See Fraser, Survey of Counseling Practices, in-ETHICAL ISSUES
IN HUMAN GENETICS 7, 12 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Fraser].
74. Fraser, supra note 73, at 12. This method must still be relied on when there ex-
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healthy couple had already had an affected child, there could be no cer-
tainty of actual risks, and no means were available to detect the
presence of defects in the fetus.75 During this time the courts were
properly in no position to impose liability upon physicians who failed to
detect or to predict genetic diseases.
However, the ability to predict the occurrence and recurrence of
genetic disorders has improved greatly. The mode of inheritance has
been determined for an increasing number of traits, and biochemical
tests have been developed that allow more definite preconception pre-
dictions for many types of genetic risk. 8 Additionally, recently devel-
oped medical technology has afforded the opportunity to make in-
formed procreative decisions. Amniocentisis77 and ultrasonography8
ists no well-tested model of heritability upon which to base more definite predictions. The
approach is used in analyzing polygenic traits, chromosomal anomalies, and other dis-
orders in which genetic factors may or may not be implicated. See Nitowsky, Genetic
Counseling: Objectives, Principles, and Procedures, 19 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
919, 932 (1976). See also Fraser, supra note 73, at 12 n.19.
75. Fraser, supra note 73, at 12.
76. Id
77. Amniocentesis involves the "transabdominal aspiration of fluid from the amniotic
sac." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 55 (4th ed. 1976). Performed on women in the early
months of their pregnancy, the test yields results which are a fairly accurate indicator of
existing chromosomal abnormality. In this procedure, a long needle is inserted into the
mother's uterus, and a sample of amniotic fluid containing living fetal cells is removed.
These cells are then placed in culture to grow so that further tests can be performed. W.
FUHRMAN & F. VOGEL, GENETIC COUNSELING 91-92 (2d ed. 1976). The sex of the fetus as
well as the presence of gross chromosomal anomalies can be determined by karyotype
analysis, a procedure in which the number and structure of chromosomes are examined
after straining at the time of cell division. A. EMERY, ELEMENTS OF MEDICAL GENETICS
54-59 (3d ed. 1974). Prenatal diagnosis is at least potentially available for approximately
sixty to ninety metabolic defects, including Tay-Sachs disease, Colbus, The Antenatal
Detection of Genetic Disorders, 48 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 497, 500-01 (1976); Milun-
sky, Prenatal Diagnosis of Genetic Disorders, 295 NEw ENG. J. MED. 377, 378 (1976), and
for the neural tube defects such as anencephaly and spina bifida. Editorial, Screening for
Neural-Tube Defects, 1 (8026) LANCET 1345 (1977); United Kingdom Collaborative Study
on Alpha-Fetoprotein in Relation to Neural-Tube Defects, Maternal Serum-Alpha-Feto-
Protein Measurement in Antenatal Screening for Anencephaly and Spina Bifida in Early
Pregnancy, 1 (8026) Lancet 1323 (1977). See also Inadequate Genetic Counseling, supra
note 3, at 1493 n.21.
78. Ultrasonography is defined as the "location, measurement or delineation of deep
structures by measuring the reflection or transmission of ultrasonic waves." STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1508 (4th ed. 1976). The increasing sophistication in the use of ultra-
sound to detect anatomical abnormalities, including such polygenic traits as the neural
tube defects, is particularly desirable since the technique seems to present no discernible
risk to the fetus. Hirchhorn, Prenatal Diagnosis of Genetic Disease, in DEVELOPMENTAL
GENETICS 87, 93 (C. FENOGLIO, R. GOODMAN & D. KING eds. 1976). See Inadequate Genetic
Counseling, supra note 3, at 1493 n.22.
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are two of the most widely used and dependable tests.79 These tech-
niques, together with the legally permitted practice of abortion,"0 now
permit prospective parents to abort fetuses afflicted with genetic
defects.81
Despite the advent of these and other techniques, 2 which clearly
possess the capability of detecting genetically diseased fetuses, courts
have been negligent in failing to fully encourage their application in
appropriate circumstances. While courts have uniformly permitted
recovery of damages by parents for the negligent failure of physicians
to utilize the various tests available, 3 they have failed to hold these
same physicians amenable to suits brought by children with defects
79. Recent studies indicate that amniocentesis is highly accurate and represents a
combined risk of less than one percent of complications ranging from spontaneous abor-
tion and fetal death to amniotic fluid leakage and maternal infection. See, e.g., Simpson,
Dallaire, Siminovich, Hamerton, Miller & McKeen, Prenatal Diagnosis of Genetic Disease
in Canada. Report of a Collaborative Study, 115 CANADIAN MED. A.J. 739 (1976) (99.4% ac-
curacy in 1223 cases); NICHD National Registry for Amniocentesis Study Group, Midtri-
mester Amniocentesis for Prenatal Diagnosis, 236 J.A.M.A. 1471, 1472 (1976) (99.4%
accuracy in 1040 cases). See also Inadequate Genetic Counseling, supra note 3, at 1493
n.21.
80. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). the Court sustained the limited right to elec-
tive abortions, holding that a state statute which prohibits or severely restricts the per-
formance of abortions violates a woman's unqualified constitutional right to privacy. Il at
147-64. Legal commentators have exhaustively analyzed the Roe decision. See Bryant,
State Legislation on Abortion After Roe v. Wade: Selected Constitutional Issues, 2 AM.
J. L. & MED. 101 (1976); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and
Its Critics, 58 B.U.L. REV. 765 (1973); Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Tem-Forwar&
Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973);
Article, Roe v. Wade: Its Impact on Rights of Choice in Human Reproduction, 5 COLUM.
HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 497 (1973); Comment, State Limitations Upon the Availability and
Accessibility of Abortions After Wade and Bolton, 25 KAN. L. REV. 87 (1976); Note, Haunt-
ing Shadows From the Rubble of Roe's Right of Privacy, 9 SUFFOLK L. REV. 145 (1974).
81. An excellent example of this is the screening for spina bifida, a congenital anoma-
ly. Spina bifida is "a defect in the spinal column, consisting in [the] absence of the
vertebral arches, through which the spinal membranes, with or without spinal cord tissue,
may protrude." STED*AN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1312 (4th ed. 1976).
82. Fetoscopy, a variation of amniocentesis, involves the addition of an optical system
to permit the physician to look inside the uterus. It is used to obtain samples of fetal
blood so that the presence of various hemoglobin disorders, such as sickle cell anemia, can
be detected. Inadequate Genetic Counseling, supra note 3, at 1493 n.21.
83. Courts have had little difficulty sustaining parental claims for pecuniary loss. See,
e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Jacobs v.
Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233
N.W.2d 372 (1975). Courts have, however, consistently denied these same plaintiffs the
right to recover for psychic or emotional harm alleged to have occurred as a consequence
of the birth of their infants in an impaired state. See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d
at 411-12, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900; Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366
N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977).
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born due to their negligence. In essence, courts are denying relief to
the very class this technology was designed to protect-fetuses, poten-
tial human beings and society. The result is that there now exists a
"lag" largely because these inventions have increased in volume faster
than the courts have made adaptations to them."
History has proven that lags are eventually reduced. Sooner or later
societal attitudes permit adjustment among the variables. Such will be
the case with wrongful life. Courts will not continue to ignore the high
degree of accuracy and predictability inherent in today's technology.
On the contrary, they will view this technology as the vehicle which
will enable judicial recognition of the wrongful life claim and at the
same time prevent wrongful life from becoming an unmanageable
cause of action.
IV. CONCLUSION
Barriers to the recognition of "wrongful life" causes of action have
been constructively designated "real" and "artificial." The artificial
barriers should rapidly disappear from decisions of courts rejecting the
wrongful life cause of action because those barriers lack substance.
And, the real barriers associated with cultural lag will disappear over
time, as beliefs and social mores "catch up" to technological advances.
In addition, the role of the jury as the proper body to decide many
of the crucial questions in a wrongful life case should increase. Many of
the unresolved questions are questions of fact; courts that dismiss
wrongful life cases as a matter of law will soon see their decisions
reversed on both law and fact. The jury, applying specific standards
based upon traditional notions of tort law, should be allowed to hear
and determine liability in wrongful life cases.
84. ON CULTURE, supra note 63, at 95.
Vol. 18:857
